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THE HOLDING-DICTUM SPECTRUM
Andrew C. Michaels ∗
“If judges are free, are indeed forced, to decide new cases
for which there is no rule, they must at least make a new rule as
they decide. So far, good. But how wide, or how narrow, is the
general rule in this particular case? That is a troublesome
matter.” 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Presumably, the terms holding and dictum have some
objective meaning. One would not say, “I do not agree with this
statement, so it is dictum.” One might say, “This statement is
dictum, so it is not binding.” 2 So what, then, is dictum? More
specifically, to what extent does the breadth of a generalization
affect its status as holding or dictum?
Strangely, despite longstanding debate in the literature, the
answers are far from clear. 3 There are, however, two propositions
that are often taken for granted. 4 The first is that holdings are
binding and dicta are not. 5 The second is that if a statement is not

∗
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Washington University Law School. J.D., New York University School of Law. The author
thanks Michael Abramowicz, Robert Brauneis, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Martin Guggenheim,
Dmitry Karshtedt, Stephen Klein, Richard Re, Pierre Schlag, Ralph Steinhardt, Lawrence
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Law, and the 2017 Mid-Atlantic Junior Faculty Forum at Richmond School of Law.
1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS
STUDY 36 (1930).
2. Note, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REV. 509, 512 (1952).
3. See, e.g., Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 219, 219-20 (2010); Dictum Revisited, supra note 2, at 512.
4. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
957 (2005); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2004 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 957; Marc McAllister, Dicta
Redefined, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 161, 165-66 (2011).
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holding then it is dictum, and vice versa. 6 These two assumptions
set up a binary paradigm: either a proposition is binding holding
or unconstraining dictum, one or the other. 7 This article takes
issue with the binary paradigm, arguing that it works against a
clear understanding, 8 and also proposes something in the way of
an alternative.
Consider, for example, a court deciding whether a particular
car is allowed in a park, which, in explaining its decision, states,
“No vehicles are allowed in the park.” This statement is of course
broader than necessary to decide the case, but nevertheless is part
of the path of reasoning that leads to the judgment. A subsequent
court constrained by the precedent of the first court is then faced
with the question of whether a wheelchair is allowed in the park.
Even if we assume that a wheelchair is indisputably a vehicle, it
is not hard to imagine the constrained court allowing the
wheelchair. The reasons that might have led the precedent court
to generalize against vehicles are probably not fully applicable to
wheelchairs, and wheelchairs present special countervailing
considerations. So the constrained court might narrow the rule
against vehicles by creating an exception for mobility aids. This
type of narrowing “happens all the time.” 9
Was the statement “no vehicles are allowed in the park” a
holding? If holdings are binding, then the answer must be no,
because the hypothetical constrained court did not follow it even
though it applied. So does that make the statement dicta? If so,
why is it dicta? Because it is broader than necessary to decide the
6. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 4, at 2004 (“[W]e would find a consensus for the
judgment that everything that is not holding is dictum and everything that is not dictum is
holding . . . .”); Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1065 (“If not a holding, a
proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.”); Judith M. Stinson, Teaching the
Holding/Dictum Distinction, 19 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 192, 192 (2011)
(“Dictum, on the other hand, is anything that is not a holding.”).
7. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 957, 961.
8. See KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 195
(2013); Shawn J. Bayern, Case Interpretation, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 125, 128-29 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104
GEO. L.J. 921, 924 (2016) [hereinafter Re, Precedent from Below] (“[N]arrowing from below
happens all the time . . . .”); Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1865 (2014) [hereinafter Re, Narrowing Precedent] (“[N]arrowing
happens all the time . . . .”); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 15
(Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1989) (1933) (“It is common
to see a later narrowing of a ratio that, in the heat of the moment and of the argument, was
too broadly phrased.”); see also infra Part III.
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case? At least in the common law context, almost any
generalization is broader than necessary to decide the case. 10
Michael Dorf has distinguished between two types of
statements which are sometimes called dicta: asides and broad
statements. 11 A clear example of an aside would be if the
precedent court in the hypothetical case above had said, “And, by
the way, no grills in the park either.” 12 This is an aside because
the question of grills in the park was not before that court. 13
Asides are pure quintessential dicta. 14 The statement “no vehicles
in the park” is a broad statement, the second type of potential
dicta, as it encompassed the facts before the court (cars are
vehicles) and would have been part of the path of reasoning that
led to the judgment. 15
While asides are clearly dicta, it is difficult to say whether
an overbroad statement is dictum, because how broad is too
broad? There is an endless spectrum of how broad such
generalizations can be made, and there is no simple place to draw
the line. 16 But if courts are to provide reasons for their decisions,
they must generalize, 17 and if precedent is to stand for anything,
10. See Dictum Revisited, supra note 2, at 509; Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4,
at 1040-41.
11. See Dorf, supra note 4, at 2007 (“Asides—justifiable or not—comprise one
category of statements commonly labeled dicta. A second category is somewhat more
amorphous. It consists of those elaborations of legal principle broader than the narrowest
proposition that can decide the case.”).
12. See id. at 2006.
13. See id.
14. For identifying this pure dicta which I am calling asides, I recommend the
definition of dicta in Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 961, as an excellent way of
doing so in difficult cases. However, that definition uses a binary paradigm and thus defines
everything else as a holding. See GREENAWALT, supra note 8, at 195 (noting that the
Abramowicz and Stearns discussion “proceeds on the premise that the choices, difficult as
they may be, are basically either-or, that the arguable instances would not, and should not,
be viewed as lying between holding and dicta or as very weak elements of holding or very
strong kinds of dicta”). By contrast, this article argues that the propositions that would meet
the Abramowicz and Stearns definition of holding (which I am referring to shorthand as
“broad statements” or the “path-to-judgment” reasoning) lie along a spectrum where
constraining force is inversely proportional to breadth.
15. See Dorf, supra note 4, at 2007, 2009.
16. See, e.g., Julius Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REV. 597,
614 (1959).
17. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641 (1995) (“[T]o
provide a reason for a decision is to include that decision within a principle of greater
generality than the decision itself,” such that to “provide a reason in a particular case is thus
to transcend the very particularity of that case.” (emphasis omitted)).
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at least some generalizations must provide some constraint on
subsequent courts. 18
How then to reconcile these two propositions: (1) overbroad
generalizations are not always followed, or can be “narrowed,”
and (2) some generalizations broader than necessary to decide the
case must have some constraining force. This article argues that
it is impossible to reconcile these realities with a binary paradigm.
It is perhaps something like trying to represent four-dimensional
space-time using three-dimensional Euclidian geometry—there is
no satisfactory way to do it. 19
But a more consistent framework can be achieved by
positing that statements that are not asides should be treated as a
spectrum or scalar. Statements narrowly tailored to the facts have
greater constraining force and approach the status of binding
holding.
Broader or more general statements have less
constraining force and tend to approach dicta. 20
Although some broad categorizations are more justifiable
than others, an assessment of breadth provides a starting point, or
rule of thumb. A next step would be to attempt to find a material
distinction from the facts, or a principled way of narrowing the
broad statement while remaining consistent with the overall
reasoning of the precedent case. 21 This comports with what
courts often do when faced with overbroad statements, in
accordance with Supreme Court guidance. 22 These inquiries are
related because broader propositions encompass more factual
variation, with a greater possibility that some such factual

18. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 577 (1987).
19. JOHN C. TAYLOR, HIDDEN UNITY IN NATURE’S LAWS 148 (2001).
20. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382 n.14 (1985)
(“Some commentators propose that the breadth of a legal directive is inversely proportional
to its strength.”); Dictum Revisited, supra note 2, at 515 (“When a legal conclusion is stated
too broadly it has a weak value as precedent if the new facts are different.”); cf. Pierre N.
Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1258
n.23 (2006).
21. See Re, Precedent from Below, supra note 9, at 936; JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY
OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 187-88 (1979) (“The ratio is binding in its basic
rationale and as applying to its original context. Courts can, however, modify its application
to different contexts so long as they preserve its fundamental rationale.”).
22. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821); Sterling v.
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 400 (1932); Bramwell v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483,
489 (1926); infra Part III.
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differences will be “material” or justify differential treatment
under the law. 23
In this article, a “constrained court” is one generally required
to follow the precedent of a “precedent court.” 24 For example,
the Federal Circuit would be constrained by Supreme Court
precedent as well as its own precedent. “Constraining force” or
“weight” is the extent to which the constrained court is compelled
to follow a proposition from a precedential court even if it does
not agree with the proposition. In other words, constraining force
is the weight a statement should have merely based on the fact
that it was endorsed in a precedent decision, regardless of its
persuasiveness as applied to the current situation.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II uses a hypothetical
to illustrate the spectrum framework, and explains how the
spectrum approach is consistent with underlying rationales for
stare decisis and furthers the value of judicial candor. Part III
reviews other approaches to holding and dicta, demonstrating that
consistent usage is impossible under the prevailing binary
paradigm, and shows that the spectrum model allows for more
meaningful discussion. Part IV evaluates some examples from
case law where courts treat precedent in a manner that is difficult
to consistently explain under prevailing approaches to holding
and dictum, but can be explained using the spectrum.

II. THE SPECTRUM EXPLAINED
A. Illustration
Consider a hypothetical statute called the “Ratio Decidendi
Park Act” that creates a cause of action for anyone whose right to
enjoy the park has been unduly burdened, and an appellate court
decision that reads as follows:
The Federal Ratio Decidendi Park Act provides a right of
action against anyone who unduly burdens a person’s
enjoyment of Ratio Decidendi Park. This case presents the
question of dogs in the park. The defendant’s Great Dane,
“Slobber,” is over 100 pounds. The court below found that
Slobber was running free in the park and ran roughshod over

23. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1053.
24. See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989).
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the plaintiff’s family picnic, scaring the plaintiff’s children
and ruining their day, and thus, the court found, unduly
burdening the family’s enjoyment of the park.
The defendant argues that she derives substantial enjoyment
from playing “fetch” with Slobber in the park—that is,
throwing a stick or other object so that Slobber can run after
it and bring it back to her. We do not doubt that this activity
is enjoyable, but we nevertheless agree with the court below
that fetch is not an appropriate activity in Ratio Decidendi
Park, as a dog playing fetch is off leash, unconstrained,
running free and thus at risk of unduly burdening the ability
of others to enjoy the park. There are other parks in the area
where the defendant can play fetch with her large Great
Dane, but there is no other park with the character of Ratio
Decidendi Park. All residents should have a reasonable
opportunity to enjoy this unique landscape. To that end,
dogs are not allowed in Ratio Decidendi Park, and
accordingly we affirm the injunction preventing Slobber
from playing fetch in the park.

What is the holding of this case? It is not clear, but of course
this is not unusual; courts often state or imply a number of pathto-judgment propositions at different levels of generality. 25 Even
if the court had attempted to signify its holding with a “we hold
that,” as courts occasionally do, this would not necessarily settle
the question. 26 The meaning of a case is often defined and refined
through subsequent cases. 27 To be sure, the In re Slobber court
did state in its ultimate sentence that “dogs are not allowed in
Ratio Decidendi Park,” but as Karl Llewellyn has explained:
[I]t pays to be suspicious of general rules which look too
wide; it pays to go slow in feeling certain that a wide rule has
been laid down at all, or that, if seemingly laid down, it will
be followed . . . . [E]verything, everything, big or small, a
judge may say in an opinion, is to be read with primary
25. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 44; Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the
Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 165 (1930).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69 n.2 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.,
concurring) (“A judge’s power to bind is limited to the issue that is before him; he cannot
transmute dictum into decision by waving a wand and uttering the word ‘hold.’”); Leval,
supra note 20, at 1257 (“A dictum is not converted into holding by forceful utterance, or by
preceding it with the words ‘We hold that . . . .’”).
27. See Jan G. Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553, 1555, 1566
(1974); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 372 (1988).
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reference to the particular dispute, the particular question
before him. 28

The following propositions all explicitly or implicitly arise
from the decision above, listed from most general (1) to most
specific (6).
1. Dogs are not allowed in Ratio Decidendi Park.
2. Dogs are not allowed off leash or unconstrained in the
park.
3. Dogs are not allowed to play fetch in the park.
4. Large dogs are not allowed to play fetch in the park.
5. Great Danes are not allowed to play fetch in the park.
6. Slobber is not allowed to play fetch in the park.
Under the spectrum model, as the statements become more
narrowly tailored to the facts before the court (towards 6) they
approach the status of binding holding. As the statements gain
breadth (towards 1) their constraining force weakens, and they
tend to approach the status of dicta. Constraining force or weight
is thus a scalar quantity with magnitude inversely proportional to
breadth for path-to-judgment statements—i.e., statements that are
not asides.
None of these six statements are asides, which count as pure
dicta under the spectrum model. An example of an aside would
be if the In re Slobber court had said “no cats in the park,” as the
question of cats in the park was not before the court. 29 But if the
court had said, “no pets in the park,” this would be a very broad
statement rather than an aside, even though it would include
cats. 30 Slobber was a pet, but not a cat. While the statement “no
cats in the park” would, as an aside, have zero constraining force
under the spectrum approach, the statement “no pets in the park”
could be part of the path-to-judgment reasoning and, as such,
would have some weak constraining force, even as applied to cats
in a future case before a constrained court.

28. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 36 (emphasis omitted); see also LLEWELLYN, supra
note 9, at 14 (“Everything, but everything, said in an opinion is to be read and understood
only in relation to the actual case before the court.”).
29. Dorf, supra note 4, at 2006 n.37 and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 2007.
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For further illustration, some examples from real case law
will be examined in Part IV, but for now consider a subsequent
constrained court faced with the question of a Seeing Eye dog:
The plaintiff brought the present case under the Ratio
Decidendi Park Act, claiming that the defendant’s Seeing
Eye dog unduly burdened the plaintiff’s right to enjoy the
park, because the plaintiff is allergic to dogs. The court
below ruled in favor of the plaintiff, quoting In re Slobber
for the proposition that “dogs are not allowed in Ratio
Decidendi Park.” But as we have explained, the purpose of
the Act is to ensure that all residents have a reasonable
opportunity to enjoy the unique landscape of Ratio
Decidendi Park. Blind residents need a Seeing Eye dog in
order to have a reasonable opportunity to enjoy the park.
Though our previous statement that dogs are not allowed was
not an aside and thus was not pure dicta, its relative breadth
makes it only a weak precedential constraint; we weigh that
constraint against countervailing factors, and consider
whether a material and principled distinction is to be found.
In re Slobber involved an unconstrained dog running free in
the park. Seeing Eye dogs, by contrast, are categorically
constrained on a leash. The park is large enough that if one
is bothered by Seeing Eye dogs, one can avoid them. To the
extent that seeing eye dogs create any burden on the ability
of other residents to enjoy the park, we do not think that
burden undue when weighed against the countervailing
benefit these dogs provide in allowing the blind a reasonable
opportunity to enjoy the park. We reverse the decision
below and hold that Seeing Eye dogs are allowed in the park.

The first sentence of the second paragraph above provides
an example of the type of language courts could use in applying
the spectrum. Though this decision creates a narrowing exception
to the broad proposition from In re Slobber that “dogs are not
allowed in Ratio Decidendi Park,” the narrowing is not
unprincipled. The opinion here seems plausibly consistent with
the overall reasoning expressed in In re Slobber, even though it
does depart from some of the precise language. Many of the
considerations that led the In re Slobber court to generalize
against dogs are not present with Seeing Eye dogs, which also
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present countervailing benefits in that they further the goal of
allowing residents the opportunity to enjoy the park in an
exceptional way. This inquiry of plausible consistency with
precedent is in some accord with what judges must do as a matter
of practice in order to avoid being reversed, or in order to get other
judges to join their opinions. 31
The facts of In re Seeing Eye Dog were different enough that
of the six propositions listed above from In re Slobber,
proposition 1 was the only one that required a departure. The
decision of In re Seeing Eye Dog was not contrary to any of
propositions 2-6 because the Seeing Eye dog was on a leash and
was not playing fetch. The spectrum approach thus allows a
constrained court some flexibility to narrow an overbroad
generalization without narrowing the decision all the way down
to its bare facts.
As precedent propositions get narrower, it becomes more
difficult to find a principled departure that does not severely
violate the overall goals of the precedent case. Propositions 4 and
5 from In re Slobber would seem to have strong constraining
weight, because the court did not give much reason to think that
the decision was based on anything particular about Slobber or
even about Great Danes. One would be hard pressed to argue, in
a court constrained by In re Slobber, that another large dog should
be allowed to play fetch in the park.
Propositions 2 and 3 would have somewhat less constraining
force, as the large size of the dog and the game of fetch seemed
as though they did play some role in the decision. The court noted
that a dog playing fetch is “running free” and emphasized that
Slobber was “over 100 pounds.” Thus a closer question would be
presented by, for example, a small dog that was off leash and
unconstrained but remaining calm. It might be possible to write
an opinion allowing such a dog in a manner consistent with the
overall reasoning of In re Slobber, though it would be more
difficult than in the case of the Seeing Eye dog, as it would require
a departure from not just proposition 1 but also from proposition
2.
31. Cf. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 79 (2008) (discussing the
“golden rule of precedent” where justices “generally know from experience, training, and
temperament they cannot be too disdainful of precedents or else they risk having other
justices show the same, or even more, disdain for their preferred precedents”).
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It is, of course, somewhat of a fiction to speak of
propositions from precedent cases as having objective “breadth,”
and “weight,” or subjective “force.” 32 But the spectrum
framework, though not perfect, provides at least a more accurate
approximation of our actual practices, as compared with the
binary paradigm wherein propositions are supposedly either
binding or unconstraining. 33 And although it is more nuanced
than the binary paradigm, the spectrum approach is not so
complex as to render the concepts of holding and dicta
unworkable.

B. Underlying Rationale
According to Judge Pierre Leval of the Second Circuit, one
reason that dictum is not binding is that it may not have been fully
considered to the extent that it speaks to issues not directly before
the court. 34 This reasoning clearly applies to asides, but it also
supports granting less weight to overbroad statements. The
broader a proposition is, the further it reaches beyond the facts
that were directly at issue. Cases that sweep too broadly in their
reasoning can create problematic law if applied rigidly to new
facts. 35 The concept was explained well by Chief Justice Marshall
in Cohens v. Virginia:

32. See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 98-99 (1998) (explaining
that the “objectivist aesthetic” and the “subjectivist aesthetic” are flawed, but also necessary
if one wants to “do law”); Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means,
85 CAL. L. REV. 427, 440 (1997) (“The slippage from the epistemic to the ontological allows
the law and its artifactual forms—doctrines, principles, policies, and so on—to be treated as
objects in their own right.”).
33. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 957, 961.
34. See Leval, supra note 20, at 1263 (“In my experience, when courts declare rules
that have no consequence for the case, their cautionary mechanism is often not engaged.
They are far more likely in these circumstances to fashion defective rules, and to assert
misguided propositions, which have not been fully thought through.”). Cf. Re, Narrowing
Precedent, supra note 9, at 1884.
35. See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03(A)(1)(d) (2017) (“Although Whelan reached the correct result given the facts of that
case, its sweeping rule and broad language extend copyright protection too far.” (emphasis
omitted) (referring to Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Labs., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986))); Pamela Samuelson, Reflections on the State of American Software Copyright Law
and the Perils of Teaching It, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 61, 63-64 (1988) (“The court’s
sweeping pronouncements in Whelan . . . went far beyond the specific issues presented by
the facts of that case . . . . [A]nd although the Whelan decision has met with a virtual
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It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions,
in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case
in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the
case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the
judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is
presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious.
The question actually before the Court is investigated with
care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which
may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to
the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases
is seldom completely investigated. 36

Under the spectrum, the less a proposition goes beyond the facts
of the case, the stronger its constraining force and, thus, the
greater the possibility that it will control in a subsequent suit
where it applies. But, precisely because it is narrower, it will
apply to a smaller array of potential future facts. 37
The spectrum approach is also consistent with rationales
underlying stare decisis, one of which is fairness or equality, or
the idea that like cases should be treated alike. 38 No two cases
are exactly alike. Some differences justify different treatment,
and some don’t. So, as Frederick Schauer explains, the issue
“is . . . not the sterile question of treating like cases alike,” but
rather “the more difficult question of whether we should base our
decisionmaking norm on relatively large categories of
likeness”—that is, how alike do the cases have to be so as to be
treated alike? 39
Professor Schauer concludes that “the
avalanche of criticism in the law review literature, the Whelan decision is having some
influence on trial court decisions.”).
36. 19 U.S (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821).
37. An interesting corollary thus suggested is that under the spectrum approach, there
is some sense in which all path-to-judgment propositions have roughly the same amount of
constraining “power,” but broader propositions spread this power out over a wider array of
potential cases and as such have less force as applied to any particular subsequent case. In
other words, narrow propositions have strong constraining weight for the relatively small set
of potential cases that they cover, whereas broad propositions have weak constraining weight
but cover a relatively large set of potential cases. If one were inclined to think in terms of
formulas, one could represent this idea as: Power = (Breadth)*(Weight) because under the
spectrum approach, the constraining force (or weight) of a path-to-judgment proposition
tends to be inversely proportional to breadth, power would remain roughly constant as
breadth changes.
38. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 24, at 9-10; Schauer, supra note 18, at 595; Jeremy
Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4
(2012); Maltz, supra note 27, at 369; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225-75 (1986).
39. Schauer, supra note 18, at 596.
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prescription to treat like cases alike, does not help us choose
between a decisional system with a strong precedential constraint
and one with virtually no precedential constraint.” 40
It is true that, under a binary paradigm, the prescription to
treat like cases alike does not help us decide whether broad
statements should be binding or not. If we have to draw a
binding/non-binding line between holding and dicta, the
prescription does help us decide where to draw it. But if we
discard the binary paradigm, the prescription to treat like cases
alike does support the notion that broader generalizations should
tend to have less constraining weight. Broader statements
encompass a wider array of potential facts, with a greater
possibility that some such differing facts will justify different
treatment under the law.
Another justification for following precedent is fostering
predictability in the law, and relatedly, that observers might rely
on precedent. 41 As will be shown in Part IV, broad statements
from different precedent cases will sometimes conflict with each
other, 42 so a system granting pure binding effect to all path-tojudgment statements would be unpredictable, in that interested
parties would not know which conflicting statement to rely upon.
Given that the Supreme Court in cases such as Cohens has
cautioned that broad statements (or general expressions) must be
considered in the context of the facts of the case, 43 there should
be some understanding that such statements may not always be
rigidly applied to new facts. Because broader statements
encompass a wider array of different facts, reliance should tend
to decrease as breadth increases. 44 This would also be in accord
with the longstanding international law principle of lex specialis
derogat legi generali, conveying that specific law prevails over

40. Id. at 596-97.
41. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE
JUDICIARY 78 (2016); Alexander, supra note 24, at 13; Schauer, supra note 18 at 597;
Waldron, supra note 38, at 4 (noting that one of the justifications for stare decisis is “the
quest for constancy and predictability in the law”); Maltz, supra note 27, at 368.
42. See infra Part IV.
43. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821).
44. Cf. Re, Precedent from Below, supra note 9, at 948 (“Because ambiguous
precedent is by definition open to reasonable debate, the presence of ambiguity in a higher
court precedent is a warning that interested parties should hedge their bets rather than rely
on reasonably disputable meanings.”).
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general law. 45 Although a spectrum framework is more malleable
and therefore may seem less predictable, this malleability is the
price to be paid for a single, consistently-workable framework for
discussing our system of precedent. 46
Because it provides a single consistent framework, the
primary advantage of the spectrum is that it encourages increased
transparency and candor. David Shapiro calls candor “the sine
qua non of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power,” and
explains that lack of candor “serves to increase the level of
cynicism about the nature of judging and of judges.” 47 By
fostering increased transparency and candor, the spectrum
approach serves the rule of law. 48
The binary paradigm discourages candor because, although
courts maintain the pretense that the terms holding and dictum
have some objective meaning, they are used inconsistently, in
such a way as to disguise the true basis for decision. 49 As will be
shown in the next part, it is not just that the courts happen to be
inconsistent in their approach; the problem is deeper in that such
inconsistency is unavoidable under the binary paradigm.
45. See Nancie Prud’homme, Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex And
Multifaceted Relationship?, 40 ISR. L. REV. 356, 366-369 (2007) (“Traditionally, the
principle of lex specialis was understood as a conflict-resolving tool . . . . In contemporary
times, the purpose and scope of lex specialis has been somewhat expanded.”).
46. Cf. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 69 (“People—and there are curiously many—
who think that precedent produces or ever did produce a certainty that did not involve matters
of judgment and persuasion . . . simply do not know our system of precedent in which they
live.”); J.D. Hsin, Law Without Absolutes: Toward a Pragmatic Science of Law, 9 WASH. U.
JURIS. REV. 219, 262 (“As these conceptual models thus come to replace conceptual
absolutes, a conceptual absolutism gives way to what we might call a conceptual
experimentalism.”).
47. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737
(1987); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 178-181
(1982) (advocating a “choice for candor” and explaining that the “language of categoricals”
is “particularly prone to manipulation”). But see Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 296, 296-97 (1990); cf. Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor,
73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1309-10 (1995).
48. See RAZ, supra note 21, at 213 (“It is one of the important principles of the [rule
of law] doctrine that the making of particular laws should be guided by open and relatively
stable general rules.”) (emphasis omitted); Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA.
L. REV. 987, 990-91 (2008) (“[J]udges must make public the legal grounds for their
decisions. Those who fail to give sincere legal justifications violate this condition of
legitimacy.”).
49. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 47, at 734 (“[A] judge who believes that a particular
precedent can fairly be distinguished . . . but who nevertheless describes it as ‘controlling,’
can properly be accused of lack of candor.”); see also infra Part III.C.
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III. THE SPECTRUM COMPARED
This part discusses different approaches to precedent and the
holding-dicta distinction. First to be discussed are the too-narrow
approaches to holding: the pure facts-plus-outcome approach and
the necessity approach. 50 These approaches are too narrow in that
they essentially limit every case to its facts, such that a case would
never stand as precedent for anything beyond its own facts.51
Second will be the too-broad announcement approach, which is
too rigid in that it counts announced rules along the path-tojudgment reasoning as binding holding regardless of how broad. 52
Third will be the cynical view, which is that courts use a narrow
approach for distinguishing precedent, but a broad
announcement-like approach when using a precedent for
support. 53 There is truth to the cynical view, but it is to some
degree an outgrowth of the binary paradigm, under which a
consistent definition of holding and dicta is impossible. 54 Fourth
will be some middle-ground approaches: the minimalist
announcement approach, 55 the material facts-plus-outcome
approach, 56 and finally the spectrum approach.

A. Overly Narrow Approach
1. Pure Facts-Plus-Outcome
The pure facts-plus-outcome approach is a non sequitur
because it does not allow a case to stand as precedent for anything
beyond its own facts. 57 Under this approach, a case stands only
for its facts and outcome. 58 Given that no two cases are exactly
alike and that there will always be at least some minor factual
distinction, the pure-facts-plus-outcome approach is somewhat
inconsistent with the concept of precedent. 59 This approach
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See infra Part III.A.
Stinson, supra note 3, at 223 n.28.
Id. at 223-24.
See infra Part III.C.
Dictum Revisited, supra note 3, at 517-18.
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 52 (1988).
Goodhart, supra note 25, at 182.
Schauer, supra note 18, at 577.
Stinson, supra note 3, at 223 n.28; Schauer, supra note 18, at 577.
Schauer, supra note 18, at 577.

2017

THE HOLDING-DICTRUM SPECTRUM

675

would thus undermine the values of fairness and predictability
supporting stare decisis. 60
For example, under a pure facts-plus-outcome approach, the
hypothetical case of Part II.A would stand only for the proposition
that Slobber may not play fetch in the park. It would have no
constraining force for even the proposition that another Great
Dane cannot play fetch in the park. Though it could of course be
persuasive, a court that did not find it persuasive would have no
obligation to give it weight, unless that court happened to be faced
with the case of Slobber playing fetch in the park, again (and even
then the fact of time would be different). So, if precedent qua
precedent is to carry any weight at all, a pure all facts-plusoutcome approach cannot stand.
A secondary point about the pure facts-plus-outcome
approach is that it is a type of result-centered approach—that is,
an approach that focuses on the facts and the outcome rather than
the reasoning. 61 In other words, result-centered approaches focus
on what the court did, rather than what it said about why it was
doing it. 62 The holding-dicta distinction is immaterial in the
context of any result-centered approach because the reasoning of
the decision has no constraining weight. 63 Later, another resultcentered approach will be discussed—the material facts-plusoutcome approach—which is a middle-ground approach and is
more defensible in that it does allow a case to stand as precedent
for something beyond its own facts. 64 But reasoning is seemingly
an integral part of the notion of case law, 65 so there is something
fundamentally unsatisfying about any approach that disregards
reasoning as result-centered approaches do. 66

2. Necessity

60. Maltz, supra note 27, at 369.
61. EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 52 (“Under a result-centered approach, the rule of a
precedent consists of the proposition that on the facts of the precedent (or some of them) the
result of the precedent should be reached.”).
62. Id. at 52-53.
63. See Alexander, supra note 24, at 25 (explaining that the holding-dictum distinction
cannot apply to a result model of precedent because under such a model “what the court says,
as opposed to what it does, is irrelevant to the constrained court”).
64. See infra Part III.D.2.
65. See Schauer, supra note 17, at 641; see also supra n.11.
66. EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 52-53.
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Under the necessity approach, dictum is any statement that
is not necessary to the decision in the case. 67 This is the most
prominent or traditional definition of dictum. 68 The necessity
approach is not a result-centered approach, so it could grant some
constraining weight to the reasoning of decisions. 69 But, as
Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns explain, despite its
prominence, the necessity definition is “indefensible.” 70
The simplest problem with the necessity definition is that it
is almost always possible to decide a case on narrower grounds. 71
An insightful 1952 student note in the Stanford Law Review put
it succinctly:
The traditional view is that a dictum is a statement in an
opinion not necessary to the decision of the case. This means
nothing. The only statement in an appellate opinion strictly
necessary to the decision of the case is the order of the court.
A quibble like this shows how useless the definition is. 72

Thus, the pure necessity approach ultimately has the same
problem as the pure facts-plus-outcome approach, in that it does
not allow a case to have precedential weight as applied to any
other case. 73 One could avoid this conclusion by taking the view
that a proposition is only unnecessary if there are sufficient other
grounds for the decision that were actually expressed, regardless
of whether a narrower ground could be imagined. 74 This is a
different and more defensible approach, which I call the
minimalist announcement approach, and will address below in
addressing what I call middle-ground approaches.
67. McAllister, supra note 5, at 166.
68. See, e.g., id. (“According to the traditional view, dicta include ‘statements in an
opinion not necessary to the decision of the case;’ holdings, on the other hand, are statements
actually necessary to decide the issue between the parties.”).
69. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1060-61.
70. Id. at 959, 1056 (rejecting the necessity approach because it is inconsistent with
the general understanding that alternative holdings are not pure dicta). For a discussion of
alternative holdings under the spectrum, see infra Part III.D.3.
71. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1041 (“It is always possible to make
statements narrower and more dependent on the particular facts of a case, but our system of
precedent sometimes counts generalizations beyond the facts of a case as holdings.”).
72. Dictum Revisited, supra note 2, at 509.
73. Cf. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1058-60 (“Taken to its logical
conclusion, this understanding of necessity would call into serious question twin premises of
legal realism: first, that judges make law, and second, that they have discretion in doing
so.”).
74. See EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 52.
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Black’s Law Dictionary offers the following advice in
defining dictum:
As a dictum is by definition no part of the doctrine of the
decision, and as the citing of it as a part of the doctrine is
almost certain to bring upon a brief maker adverse comment,
lawyers are accustomed to speak of a dictum rather
slightingly, and sometimes they go so far as to intimate a
belief that the pronouncing of a dictum is the doing of a
wrong. Yet it must not be forgotten that dicta are frequently,
and indeed usually, correct, and that to give an occasional
illustration, or to say that the doctrine of the case would not
apply to some case of an hypothetical nature, or to trace the
history of a doctrine, even though it be conceded, as it must,
that such passages are not essential to the deciding of the
very case, is often extremely useful to the profession.75

Though this appears in a dictionary, it is not a definition; it
merely opines that dicta (whatever it is) generally should not be
cited in a brief but may still be “extremely useful to the
profession.” 76 The ambivalent advice, however, does seem to
imply or assume something like the necessity definition, that is,
that dicta “are not essential to the deciding of the very case.” 77
Thus, perhaps fittingly, this purported definition of dictum
performs precisely the sleight of hand that is often done in the
courts, which is to act as though that the concept of dictum is so
incontestably simple that it requires no definition. 78

B. Overbroad Announcement Approach
Rejecting the pure facts-plus-outcome and necessity
approaches for being too narrow, some relatively recent
75. Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (quoting WILLIAM M. LILE
BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 307 (Roger W. Cooley & Charles
Lesley Ames eds., 3d ed. 1914)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Dorf, supra note 4, at 2003-04 (“Judges often appear to take for granted that
discerning the difference between holding and dictum is a routine, noncontroversial matter.
Yet an examination of the kinds of statements that courts label dicta reveals gross
inconsistencies.”); see also Dictum Revisited, supra note 2, at 509 (“Dictum is one of the
commonest yet least discussed of legal concepts. Every lawyer thinks he knows what it
means, yet few lawyers think much more about it. Nonthinking and overuse combine to
make for fuzziness.”).
ET AL.,
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commentators appear to embrace a version of what Melvin
Eisenberg calls the “announcement” approach, where “the rule of
a precedent consists of the rule it states, provided that rule is
relevant to the issues raised by the dispute before the court.”79
The announcement approach is often used by courts and litigants,
quoting announced statements from cases as having precedential
weight. 80 In perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of dicta,
Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns offer the following
definitions:
A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen
decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually
decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead
to the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition stated in a
case counts as dicta. 81

The announcement approach generally allows “judges to
determine the breadth of their holdings.” 82 As Professors
Abramowicz and Stearns explained, “[A] court can fit the facts of
a case within a broad circle and resolve all the fact patterns within
that circle, but it cannot then annex an additional circle and
resolve the fact patterns within that circle too.” 83 This mirrors
Michael Dorf’s distinction noted earlier between asides and
overbroad statements (asides being the “additional circle”). 84 If
a court deciding whether a car is allowed in a park were to say
“no wheelchairs in the park,” that would be an aside, but if it were
to say “no vehicles in the park,” that would be a broad statement,
even though it would include wheelchairs. 85 “Cars” and
“wheelchairs” are two separate non-overlapping circles, but
“vehicles” is a larger circle that surrounds both. Under the
announcement approach, it seems that asides are dicta but there is
no breadth limit on holdings. 86 To put it differently, under this
79. EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 55.
80. Id. (“The use of this approach is so common that it needs no extensive illustration.
Pick up any reported case and examples will come readily to hand.”).
81. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1065. The second sentence of this
definition makes clear that it assumes a binary paradigm. See id. (“If not a holding, a
proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.”).
82. Id. at 1040-41.
83. Id. at 1041.
84. See Dorf, supra note 4, at 2007.
85. Id. at 2006-07.
86. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1041, 1065.
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binary approach, asides have constraining force of zero, but pathto-judgment statements have full binding force regardless of their
breadth. 87
The conceptual problem with the announcement approach is
that it does not sufficiently account for the fact that courts, in
explaining their decisions, will inevitably make overbroad
generalizations. 88 If decisions are to stand as precedent for
anything beyond their own facts, they must generalize to some
extent. These generalizations in reasoning are not accidental; to
the contrary, they are at the core of our system of precedent. 89
But generalizations will not always be perfect; the courts cannot
be expected to foresee or fully consider all potential fact situations
falling within the generalizations that they necessarily make. 90
To return to the hypothetical of Part II.A, the In re Seeing
Eye Dog court would seem under this approach to be bound by
the prior announcement that “dogs are not allowed” and would
not have any leeway to create a reasonable narrowing exception
for seeing eye dogs. 91 But the fact is that this type of narrowing
happens all the time. 92 This is why a consistently workable
87. See id. at 1041.
88. See Schauer, supra note 17, at 647-48.
89. See id. at 635 (“The institution we call ‘law’ is soaked with generality, for one of
its central features is the use of norms reaching beyond particular events and individual
disputes. Indeed, it is more than mere coincidence that the very name for the enterprise—
law—is the same one that scientists use to designate exceptionless empirical
generalizations.”).
90. LLEWELLYN, supra note 9, at 15 (“The original judge, later courts will say, did not
have the other possible sorts of cases in mind; now we have one of those cases not foreseen
by him before us for decision, and we must reconsider the overbroad wording he
employed . . . and so on.”).
91. One might attempt to avoid this type of conclusion by arguing, for example, that
the In re Slobber court did not really mean to endorse the proposition that all dogs are not
allowed in the park. Cf. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 966 (“There will often be
ambiguities about just what propositions a particular opinion endorsed, and where the
boundary lines of those propositions lie.”). But again, generalizations in case law are
inevitable and are not accidental. If cases are to stand as precedent for anything beyond their
own facts, they must generalize. When a court makes a generalization such as “dogs are not
allowed in the park,” the court often cannot have not considered all possible instances of
dogs in the park (this is a fortiori true as the generalizations get broader and the cases more
complex), but the court nevertheless makes and endorses the generalization.
92. See Dorf, supra note 4, at 2004-05, 2066; see also EISENBERG, supra note 55, at
55 (explaining that “despite its predominance the announcement approach does not describe
all judicial practice” as “[m]any cases do deal with precedents in part by using moderate
versions of the minimalist or result-centered approaches to reformulate the rule announced
by the precedent court”); see also infra Part IV.
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framework for holding and dicta cannot treat all path-to-judgment
generalizations as pure binding holding.
A pure announcement approach would seem to be in some
accord with Pierre Schlag’s aesthetic of “the grid,” where “law is
stabilized and objectified into an orderly field of clearly
delineated, neatly bounded, perfectly contiguous legal
conceptions and propositions,” with the appeal of “stability,
predictability, and uniformity.” 93 But as Professor Schlag
explains, the grid is “inert,” and “does not move,” such that “to
even pose the problem of legal change is already to weaken the
grid.” 94 If path-to-judgment announcements are generally
considered pure binding holding, it seems inevitable that holdings
will conflict. 95 This runs counter to any claim that the
announcement approach has the advantage of predictability as
compared with a more flexible approach, for if two announced
rules conflict, it may be difficult to predict which would prevail. 96
Both the Supreme Court and distinguished commentators have
accordingly cautioned that general statements must always be
viewed in the context of the facts of the case decided. 97 A
consistently-workable model of holding and dicta must better
account for the fact that the announcing court “might have
selected its rationale without fully anticipating the implications of
its immediate holding for a significant future case.” 98

C. Cynical Inconsistent Approach
The cynical view is that a court will take a broad approach
to precedent it wants to follow, and a narrow approach to

93. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1055
(2002).
94. Id. at 1065-66.
95. See id. at 1063.
96. Id. (“One problem posed by the multiplication of classification schemes is simple:
What happens when some lines of division in one scheme sometimes register in some other
set and sometimes not? Which classification scheme enjoys priority over the other—or are
they coequals?”); see also infra Part IV.
97. See Goodhart, supra note 25, at 169; Dictum Revisited, supra note 2, at 509;
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821).
98. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1050; see also RAZ, supra note 21, at 188
(“[C]ourts may be and often are a little careless in formulating rules.”); BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 48 (1921).
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precedent that it does not want to follow. 99 Karl Llewellyn
explains that the doctrine of precedent is “two-headed” or “Janusfaced,” in that a judge will apply one doctrine of precedent when
following a case and a “wholly contradictory” doctrine when
distinguishing a case. 100
But when a court classifies a statement from a precedent case
as dictum, there is at least a pretense that this means something
more than that the court does not intend to follow it.101 That is,
the terms holding and dicta are generally presented as constative
rather than performative. 102 A court would not say “we do not
agree with this statement, so it is dictum”; rather, it might say
“this statement is dictum, so we are not required to follow it.”103
To use an inconsistent approach to dicta is thus to disguise a
performative as a constative, and to mask the true basis for the
decision. 104
Nevertheless, there is truth to the cynical view. 105 For
example, Michael Dorf reviews the Supreme Court’s removal line
of cases and argues persuasively that the decisions are not
consistent. 106 But, considering the prominent approaches that
have been discussed so far, it is easy to see why courts are
sometimes inconsistent in their approach to dicta. To return to
99. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 65.
100. Id. (“[T]here is one doctrine for getting rid of precedents deemed troublesome
and one doctrine for making use of precedents that seem helpful.”).
101. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 956.
102. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 4 (J.O. Urmson & Marina
Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975) (explaining that the performative masquerading as a constative can
“engender rather special varieties of ‘nonsense’”); David Gray Carlson, Jurisprudence and
Personality in the Work of John Rawls, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1828, 1830 n.9 (1994) (“A
‘performative’ is an articulation that demands no prior reality for its existence. A ‘constative’
is a report of some pre-existing reality.”).
103. Dictum Revisited, supra note 2, at 509, 517-18.
104. See id. (explaining that the use of the word dictum “is absolutely indefensible if
the primary meaning of the word is incorrectness,” because in that case “the word only
disguises the true basis of decision”); Pintip Hompluem Dunn, How Judges Overrule:
Speech Act Theory and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 493, 525 (2003) (“[T]he
Court enacts the constative fallacy by attempting to disguise its performative utterances as
constative ones . . . .”); cf. Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses
of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929, 948-49 (1988) (discussing “a catch-22
between what law means (i.e. constative significance) and what law does (i.e. performative
significance)”).
105. See, e.g., Andrew C. Michaels, Pot Calls Kettle Dictum: Expanded Secret Prior
Art in Obviousness, 26 FED. CIR. B.J. 93, 100-102 (2016) (exposing inconsistency in Federal
Circuit treatment of dicta).
106. Dorf, supra note 4, at 2022-24.
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the example from Part II.A, under an announcement approach In
re Slobber would be binding even in its broadest announced
proposition (1), but under a necessity approach it would stand (at
most) only for the narrowest proposition (6). 107 If the only
choices are these two extremes, then some inconsistency is
unavoidable, given the inevitable reality of overbroad
generalizations. 108 A subsequent constrained court like the In re
Seeing Eye Dog court, in reasonably declining to treat proposition
(1) as dispositive, under a binary paradigm would be forced to
conclude that the statement is dicta, using one of the narrow
approaches such as necessity. 109 Yet such a narrow approach—if
consistently applied—is a slippery slope that would essentially
narrow every decision all the way to its facts, so it would not
allow the court to use a generalization from another case for
support. 110
The problem of inconsistency is related to the adversarial
nature of our legal system. 111 A litigant generally has incentive
to argue for either a strong or weak reading of a particular
precedent, and may be reluctant to recognize ambiguity. 112
Similarly, a court ultimately will adhere to a proposition or not,
which can create the illusion of a binary paradigm. Courts are
under pressure to choose one side over another and to justify that
choice, and accordingly may have a tendency to make questions
of precedent seem more clear-cut than they actually are. 113 When
a court follows a proposition from precedent, it can seem as
though that proposition had absolute binding effect, though
perhaps it was merely one factor among many. 114 Conversely,
when a court declines to follow a proposition from a precedent
case, it may seem as though that proposition was treated as pure
dictum and was given no constraining weight, though it may have
simply been outweighed by other countervailing cases or

107. McAllister, supra note 5, at 166; EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 54-55.
108. RAZ, supra note 21, at 188.
109. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 957, 973; McAllister, supra note 5, at
166.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Schauer, supra note 18, at 577.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 69.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id.
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considerations. 115 Courts may have some tendency to foster these
illusions as a way of attempting to bolster their decisions,
intimating that the result is clearly dictated by precedent rather
than a more subjective balancing of authorities. 116
In this way, the binary paradigm could be seen as something
of a “legitimation myth.” 117 But as Professor Schlag has
explained: “[I]n dealing with any legal system, we jurists and
legal scholars cannot just deal with its legitimation myths, but
must instead try to ascertain as coldly as possible something a bit
more complex—namely its actual organizing principles.” 118
And from a more practical perspective, a consistent middleground framework could help curb deceptive manipulation of
precedent and thereby further judicial legitimacy, as Professors
Abramowicz and Stearns explain:
If the holding-dicta distinction were perfectly clear (a goal
that we recognize as impossible), then disingenuous
manipulation of precedents would be immediately
recognizable. That clarity would reduce the incidence of
manipulation and increase the legitimacy of the judicial
process. 119
115. Id.
116. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983) (“Judges
are people of violence. Because of the violence they command, judges characteristically do
not create law, but kill it. Theirs is the jurispathic office. Confronting the luxuriant growth
of a hundred legal traditions, they assert that this one is law and destroy or try to destroy the
rest.”); Pierre Schlag, My Dinner at Langdell’s, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 851, 855-57 (2004)
(providing a fictional dialogue on reductionism in law, wherein the “Duncan Kennedy”
character states: “[S]ometimes, very often actually, taking too intelligent a view of the matter
will hinder the judge’s effort to reach a holding, to achieve a conclusion”); Paul F. Campos,
Advocacy and Scholarship, 81 CAL. L. REV. 817, 836 (1993) (“The doctrinal approach is, in
short, an almost purely rhetorical activity bereft of any significant descriptive depth.”).
117. See Pierre Schlag, Hohfeldian Analysis, Liberalism and Adjudication (Some
Tensions), in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: EDITED MAJOR WORKS, SELECT
PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES (Shyam Balganesh, Ted Sichelman &
Henry Smith eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 19-20) (available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941839
[https://perma.cc/HF84REDF]).
118. Id. (manuscript at 20); see also Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Holding and
Dictum, 39 J. Legal Education 431,442 (1989) (“[S]imple dichotomies such as holdingdictum and overruling-distinguishing do not adequately capture our complex practices.
Lawyers who want to use concepts in a way that will persuade may not need to worry too
much about these subtleties, but for scholars who seek to illuminate what the practices are
really like finding an appropriate terminology is difficult.”).
119. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1024; see also Dorf, supra note 4, at
2067.
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While perfect clarity surely is impossible, a framework that
accounts for legitimate narrowing of the inevitable overbroad
general statements, while still allowing cases to weigh as
precedent for something beyond their own facts, would be a step
in the right direction. But the prevailing binary paradigm is
standing in the way of such a framework.

D. Middle Ground Approach
1. Minimalist Announcement
Under the minimalist announcement approach, the
narrowest announced rule is the holding, and everything else is
dicta. 120 This approach is somewhat of a hybrid between the
necessity approach and the pure announcement approach. 121 It
differs from the necessity approach because here it does not
matter if the court could have articulated a narrower basis, or if
such a basis can be imagined. 122
And the minimalist
announcement approach differs from the pure announcement
approach in that instead of counting all path-to-judgment
announcements as holdings, only the narrowest announced rule is
a holding. 123
One problem with this approach is that it may be difficult to
determine the narrowest announced rule in a decision. 124 But
even setting this difficulty aside, there is a more fundamental
problem in that the minimalist announcement approach
perversely grants broader precedential authority to less-thorough
opinions. 125 By articulating narrower reasons for its decision, a
court would render any broader generalizations devoid of
constraining force. 126 In contrast, under a spectrum approach,
although a narrow rule would have stronger constraining weight
than a broad one, articulation of a narrower rule would not ipso
120. Cf. EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 52 (discussing a “minimalist” approach where
“the rule of a precedent consists of that part of the rule announced by the precedent court’s
opinion that was necessary for the decision”).
121. Id.; see also supra Part III.A-.B.
122. Compare EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 52, with McAllister, supra note 5, at 166.
123. EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 52.
124. Id. at 52-53.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 53-54.
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facto eliminate (or even lessen) the constraining force of a broader
announcement.
The minimalist announcement approach thus helps to
demonstrate the problem with the binary paradigm. Finding
announcement too broad and necessity too narrow, one seeks a
middle ground. But any attempt to draw a middle-ground line
between holding and dicta will be arbitrary and unsatisfactory.
To return to the Abramowicz and Stearns device of a circle, it
seems impossible to say that once the circle expands beyond a
certain size it crosses the line from holding to dicta. 127 The
spectrum approach does not draw a line; rather, it posits that
constraining force gradually weakens as the circle expands.

2. Material Facts-Plus-Outcome
The material facts-plus-outcome approach is attributable to
Arthur Goodhart, who was of the view that the “principle of the
case is found by taking account (a) of the facts treated by the judge
as material, and (b) his decision as based on them.” 128 This
approach differs from the pure facts-plus-outcome approach
discussed earlier in that the precedential effect of a case is not
limited based on all of the facts, only the material facts. 129 This
view is more defensible because it allows a case to stand as
precedent for something beyond its own facts. 130 Though no two
cases will have exactly the same facts, some may have the same
facts in all material respects. 131 The key then is to distinguish
between a “material” factual distinction and a distinction without
a difference. 132 Professor Goodhart explains that “the facts of
127. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1040-41; see also Leval, supra note 20,
at 1258 (“There is no line demarcating a clear boundary between holding and dictum. What
separates holding from dictum is better seen as a zone, within which no confident
determination can be made whether the proposition should be considered holding or
dictum.”).
128. Goodhart, supra note 25, at 182.
129. EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 53.
130. See Goodhart, supra note 25, at 169, 182.
131. See Schauer, supra note 18, at 577; Goodhart, supra note 25, at 169-70.
132. Cf. Robin Feldman, A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making, 5 HAST. SCI.
& TECH. L.J. 1, 22 (2013) (explaining that in determining whether a factual distinction should
make a legal difference, “[o]ne must ask why the [factual] difference matters in the full
doctrinal framework of the question”); Alice Corp. Pty v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347,
2357 (2014) (“[T]here is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in
Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue here.” (emphasis added)).
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person, time, place, kind, and amount are presumably immaterial
unless stated to be material.” 133
The material facts-plus-outcome approach is, like the pure
facts-plus-outcome approach, a result-centered approach. 134 So
the holding-dictum distinction is immaterial under this approach;
it does not matter whether certain propositions of reasoning are
holding or dicta because the reasoning has no constraining effect
in and of itself. 135 Under this view, the only relevance of the
opinion is its identification of material facts. 136
The common criticism of Professor Goodhart’s approach is
that it is difficult to determine what facts were material. 137 Julius
Stone demonstrated this criticism using the British case of
Donoghue v. Stevenson, where the plaintiff discovered a
decomposed snail in a bottle of ginger beer purchased in a café. 138
Stone argued that the fact as to the vehicle of harm could be stated
at various levels of generality as follows:
An opaque bottle of ginger beer, or an opaque bottle of
beverage, or any bottle of beverage, or any container of
commodities for human consumption, or any containers of
any chattels for human use, or any chattel whatsoever, or any
thing (including land or buildings). 139

But to push back on this criticism, the problem of identifying
the correct level of generality is somewhat inherent in our system
of precedent. 140 And some degree of flexibility is desirable so as
to allow subsequent courts to adjust for unforeseen situations and
evolving circumstances. 141
133. Goodhart, supra note 25, at 169.
134. EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 52; Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1053,
1055.
135. See Alexander, supra note 24, at 25; see also supra note 63 and accompanying
text.
136. Goodhart, supra note 25, at 169 (“It is by his choice of the material facts that the
judge creates law.”).
137. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 53.
138. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] AC 562 (HL) 562 (appeal taken from Scot.);
Stone, supra note 16, at 603.
139. Stone, supra note 16, at 603.
140. See Schauer, supra note 18, at 577 (“[I]t is clear that the relevance of an earlier
precedent depends on how we characterize the facts arising in the earlier case.”).
141. Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The law
embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt
with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to
know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.”); Oliver
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The spectrum model borrows from Professor Goodhart’s
approach in allowing a constrained court to narrow an overbroad
announcement by drawing a principled material distinction from
the facts of a precedent case, so long as the narrowing is generally
consistent with the overall goals and reasoning of the precedent
case. The fundamental difference, though, is that the spectrum
approach begins with and focuses primarily on the reasoning of
the precedent case as having constraining weight, whereas the
material facts-plus-outcome approach, being result-centered,
focuses on the facts and outcome. 142
Professor Goodhart proposes some rules for determining
what facts are material, but these rules are somewhat out of touch
with the way in which modern judicial opinions are written. 143
One such rule is that “if the opinion does not distinguish between
material and immaterial facts then all the facts set forth must be
considered material.” 144 But modern opinions are generally not
directly focused on distinguishing material and immaterial
facts. 145
The primary problem with the material facts-plus-outcome
approach is thus that it does not accord with modern practice, for
courts generally focus their decisions on reasoning from
announced rules in precedent, rather than on identifying material
facts. 146 As Melvin Eisenberg explains, “[O]bservation shows
that courts usually reason from precedent by starting with the rule
the precedent announced,” rather than “disregarding the rule
entirely and instead constructing a rule out of the facts of the

Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897); DWORKIN, supra
note 38, at 413 (“Law’s attitude is constructive: it aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay
principle over practice to show the best route to a better future, keeping the right faith with
the past.”).
142. See Goodhart, supra note 25, at 182 (“The principle of a case is not found in the
reasons given in the opinion.”).
143. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1052 n.286 (explaining that parts of
Goodhart’s analysis “appear dated,” for example how he “carefully analyzes the precedential
value of cases where courts have not issued opinions and where different reporters indicate
different versions of the facts, small problems today”).
144. Goodhart, supra note 25, at 182.
145. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1055; Dorf, supra note 4, at 203637.
146. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1055; Dorf, supra note 4, at 203637 (“[J]udges typically pay a great deal of attention to the words as well as the results of
judicial decisions.”).
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precedent and its result.” 147 Particularly with the advent of
computerized searching of cases, the quoting of snippets of cases
has pushed practice further in this direction. 148 Judith Stinson
provides an interesting account of how gradual changes to the
Bluebook citation rules reflect an increasing elevation of judicial
statements. 149
The material facts-plus-outcome approach does have the
advantage of providing some weight to precedent while still
allowing for reasonable distinctions.
But the spectrum
framework discussed next has this same advantage, and is more
in accord with modern practices by placing weight on the
reasoning of decisions rather than just facts and outcomes. 150

3. Spectrum
To use the spectrum approach, first determine whether the
proposition in question is what I have been referring to as an
aside. 151 If it is an aside, then it is pure dicta and has no
constraining force, though it may of course be persuasive.
Otherwise, the proposition has some constraining force, with the
amount of constraining force tending to be inversely proportional
to breadth. A subsequent court may find the relatively weak
constraining force of broad generalizations outweighed by
countervailing considerations, and may narrow overbroad
statements by finding a principled distinction consistent with the
overall reasoning of the precedent case. This inquiry correlates
with breadth because it will be more difficult to find a material
distinction from within generalizations that are narrowly tailored
to the facts of the precedent case.

147. EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 55.
148. Stinson, supra note 3, at 245-46 (“[L]awyers and judges increasingly rely on the
words found in judicial opinions rather than the underlying components of those judicial
decisions . . . .”); see also Thomas L. Fowler, Holding, Dictum . . . Whatever, 25 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 139, 140-141 (2003). Apparently some had begun to notice a shift as early as 1927. See
Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 AM. B. ASS’N J. 71, 71-72 (1928) (“[W]e
are well on our way toward a shift from following decisions to following so-called
principles . . . .”).
149. Stinson, supra note 3, at 255-258; see also Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization
of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1247 (2007).
150. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1055; Dorf, supra note 4, at 2037.
151. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.A.

2017

THE HOLDING-DICTRUM SPECTRUM

689

Applying the device of the circle to the hypothetical of Part
II.A, 152 one could think of the six propositions as six concentric
circles, with proposition 1 being the largest (broadest) circle, and
proposition 6 being the smallest (narrowest) circle. The circles
would be centered around a point representing the facts of In re
Slobber. Only proposition 1, the largest circle, covered the facts
of In re Seeing Eye Dog. The Seeing Eye Dog facts could
accordingly be thought of as a point lying outside of all of circles
2-6, and thus just inside the periphery of the largest circle. The
closer the facts before a constrained court lie to the center of the
precedent circle, the more difficult it is to find principled
distinctions from all of the surrounding generalizations, and thus
the stronger the constraining force of the precedent case.
The general notion of a spectrum involving holding and dicta
is not entirely new to this article. Kent Greenawalt raised the
possibility of a spectrum “according to which the degree of force
varies according to multiple criteria,” as an “alternative
conceptualization” as compared with the traditional binary
holding-dictum distinction, and noted that “what judges actually
do probably lies closer to this alternative conceptualization than
to the traditional dichotomy.” 153 The possibility of a spectrum
was also briefly raised, but dismissed, by Michael Dorf, who
wondered if “the holding/dictum distinction oversimplifies
matters by substituting a sharp dichotomy for a multidimensional
spectrum.” 154 Professor Dorf worried that “if this were so, we
might have to abandon the distinction entirely,” and ultimately
rejected “so radical an explanation.” 155
But recognizing the spectrum does not require that we throw
up our hands and completely abandon the concepts of holding and
dictum. Asides remain pure dictum. Broad path-to-judgment
statements could be referred to as weak constraints, narrow ones
as strong constraints. Courts and litigants would no doubt still
sometimes refer to themselves as “bound” by “holdings” when
there is no sufficient reason to deviate from a strong enough

152.
1040-41.
153.
154.
155.

See supra text accompanying note 83; Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at
GREENAWALT, supra note 8, at 194.
Dorf, supra note 4, at 2013.
Id.
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constraint, but it should be recognized that such utterances are
somewhat performative.
Shawn Bayern has also advocated for a flexible approach to
case interpretation focusing on context and intent, where “the
precedential effect of a previously announced rule corresponds to
what we infer the court intended to announce, given what we
know about the limitations in the court’s viewpoint arising from
the factual context in which the disputed issues were raised before
the court.” 156
Under Professor Bayern’s approach,
“announcements from previous cases” are part of a “continuum of
authority along multiple axes,” “precedent precisely to the extent
context dictates.” 157 Professor Bayern argues “for a general
interpretive approach that aims primarily to determine the intent
of a case’s legal announcements.” 158 But Professor Bayern’s
approach seems to be to discard the holding-dicta distinction in
favor of his contextual analysis of intent. 159 The spectrum
approach set forth in this article provides some structure for
enhancing the holding-dicta distinction rather than discarding it.
Although breadth is a useful starting point, other
considerations, such as the existence of alternative lines of
reasoning, may affect the weight of the constraint in a secondary
sense. The general consensus seems to be that alternative paths
of reasoning are not dicta, because, if they were, a case that
expressed alternative reasons would have no holding. 160 But this
reasoning rests on a binary paradigm (i.e., it can’t be that both
alternatives are pure dicta, so they must both be holdings). 161 In
reality, though, alternative holdings are sometimes treated as
having diminished weight. 162 Judge Pierre Leval explains that
courts “often give less careful attention to propositions uttered in
support of unnecessary alternative holdings,” and he considers
156. Bayern, supra note 8, at 137.
157. Id. at 138, 143.
158. Id. at 174. But cf. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1054 n.300
(“Requiring an analysis of judicial intent, however, is unlikely to promote clarity in
distinguishing holding from dicta.”).
159. Bayern, supra note 8, at 126.
160. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 959 n.15 (“[I]t cannot be the case
that an opinion that strikes down a law on two grounds rather than one expresses no
holding.”); Dorf, supra note 4, at 2044; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537
(1940).
161. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 957, 960-61.
162. See Michaels, supra note 105, at 98.
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such statements as part of a “zone” of uncertainty lying between
holding and dictum. 163 Discarding the binary paradigm, the
existence of alternative lines of reasoning may function to
weaken—but not eliminate—the constraining weight of any
single line of reasoning.
Other potentially relevant secondary factors include the way
a precedent case was argued, or the extent to which the precedent
court emphasized a certain point. If a proposed distinction from
a broad precedent proposition was obviously considered and
rejected by the precedent court, it is doubtful that such distinction
would be consistent with the overall goals and reasoning of the
precedent case. In determining the appropriate constraining force
of a broad statement, it may also make some difference whether
the statement was made by a superior court, that is, whether the
stare decisis is horizontal or vertical. 164
Though stopping short of a continuous spectrum, certain
terminology in occasional use suggests a non-binary paradigm. 165
The term “judicial dicta” (as compared with “obiter dicta”) has
been called a “paradox” by Michael Sean Quinn because it seems
contrary to the traditional binary paradigm. 166 Similarly, a nonbinary approach was suggested by Karl Llewellyn, who
distinguished between the holding, which “must be stated quite
narrowly,” and the ratio decidendi, which provides the “generally
applicable rule of law on which the opinion says the holding
rested,” and may have “so to speak, second-order precedential
value.” 167 However, Professors Abramowicz and Stearns note
that this “distinction between holding and ratio decidendi has
blurred, as has that between dictum and obiter dictum,” and refer
to the distinctions as “seemingly dated.” 168 While such
distinctions could be called formalistic, 169 the binary paradigm
163. Leval, supra note 20, at 1258 n.23.
164. See Schauer, supra note 18, at 576; Stinson, supra note 3, at 242-43; see also
infra note 242.
165. Michael Sean Quinn, Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and
Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 655, 698, 717
(1999).
166. Id. at 717 (“The notion of judicial dicta as semi-binding rules is contrary to the
theory of stare decisis as classically conceived. Nevertheless, it is reality.”).
167. LLEWELLYN, supra note 9, at 14-15 (“The ratio as stated is, of course, always
prima facie the rule of the case, but only prima facie.”).
168. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1048.
169. See id. at 1049 n.266.
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seems to me even more formalistic, in that it uses only two
categories instead of three or four.
Larry Alexander appears to endorse a version of the
announcement approach, which he calls the “rule model,” though
he does recognize that the rules announced could have a
“moderate but not absolute strength.” 170 But he dismisses as
“theoretically indefensible” a position he takes to be expressed in
a dissent by Justice Harlan “that a judge may be bound by a
narrow, but still general, rule with which he disagrees, but not be
bound by the broader rule that the previous court endorsed and
from which it derived the narrow rule . . . .” 171 Justice Harlan’s
position in dissent was as follows:
The same illogical way of dealing with a Fourteenth
Amendment problem was employed in Malloy v. Hogan,
which held that the Due Process Clause guaranteed the
protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment against state action. I disagreed at that time
both with the way the question was framed and with the
result the Court reached. I consider myself bound by the
Court’s holding in Malloy with respect to self-incrimination.
I do not think that Malloy held, nor would I consider myself
bound by a holding, that every question arising under the
Due Process Clause shall be settled by an arbitrary decision
whether a clause in the Bill of Rights is “in” or “out.” 172

Justice Harlan’s position only seems indefensible to the
extent that it draws a binding/non-binding line in between the
broad statement and the narrow one, as there is no reason
provided for drawing the line precisely there. 173 But aside from
this binary aspect, Justice Harlan’s position is in accord with the
spectrum framework. Justice Harlan appears to have been of the
reasonable view that, while the Malloy Court carefully considered
the question with respect to self-incrimination, a generalization as
to every question arising under the Due Process Clause would
reach too far beyond the Malloy facts to have much subsequent
constraining force. 174
170. Alexander, supra note 24, at 51, 62-63.
171. Id. at 18 n.20 (referring to Justice Harlan’s dissent in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 181 n.18 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
172. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 181 n.18 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
173. See id.
174. See id.
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If the spectrum were somehow adopted into legal practice,
wouldn’t courts and litigants just argue about where on the
spectrum to place a statement, or about the relative weights of
different propositions? Yes, surely they would, but in my view
this is a more meaningful argument as compared with one in
which the term dicta has no consistent definition. If dictum has
no consistent objective meaning, then it is impossible to have a
meaningful debate as to whether a proposition is dictum. The
binary paradigm breeds inconsistency and is ultimately
incoherent. The spectrum approach can be thought of as a
common battlefield on which the two sides of a debate over
precedent can more directly engage.
But then wouldn’t courts and litigants just find more
nuanced ways to disagree? Is this just another (meta) installment
in the endless debate between rules and standards? 175 Perhaps in
some sense, but the problem is not just that the “rule” definition
of dicta is not consistently applied; it’s deeper in that there is no
consistent definition at all, because the prevailing binary
paradigm is incapable of supporting one. 176 A consistent
definition is impossible under a binary paradigm. 177 If the
concepts holding and dicta are to be used, it seems to me that they
should have a more consistent meaning. Otherwise, the terms
serve only to disguise the true basis for decision, hindering
transparency and discouraging judicial candor. 178 The spectrum
framework is a suggestion for how to make the concepts of
holding and dictum more nuanced but still workable—a more
accurate and less deceptive approximation of actual legal
practices.

175. See Schlag, supra note 20, at 383 (explaining that the “dialectic” of rules versus
standards “doesn’t go anywhere” and “is an arrested dialectic”); Schlag, supra note 116, at
859-860. Cf. Pierre Schlag, The American Road to Fascism (Law, Decadence, and the PostLiberal State) 52-53 (Univ. of Colo. Boulder, Legal Studies Res. Paper No. 17-14, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com /sol3 /papers.cfm? abstract_id=2968059 [https://perma.cc/ GS9598VL] (“This is a state which, because it continually rehearses (or collapses into) this
arrested dialectic, isn’t going anywhere. . . . What I want to suggest then is that [in civil
society] this stasis leads (among other things) to decadence.”).
176. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 958.
177. Id. at 1009.
178. See GREENAWALT, supra note 8, at 195 (explaining that a binary holding dictum
paradigm “invites manipulation by courts, both those setting precedents and those following
them, thus encouraging a lack of candor”).

694

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 70:3

IV. THE SPECTRUM IN PRACTICE
This article will now look at two examples from case law
and evaluate them in light of the spectrum approach as compared
with other approaches. The treatment of different precedents
cited in these cases, narrowing them or using them for support, is
difficult to reconcile under any one binary approach, but can be
explained consistently under the spectrum framework.

A. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States
In this Fifth Amendment Takings case, the Supreme Court
reversed the Federal Circuit, and in doing so warned the Federal
Circuit not to adhere too rigidly to broad statements in the Court’s
precedents. 179 The Arkansas case helps to demonstrate the
problem with the overbroad announcement approach discussed in
Part III.B, in that broad path-to-judgment statements from
different precedential cases sometimes conflict, leaving the
constrained court simultaneously bound to rule in opposite
directions. 180
The alleged taking occurred by way of increased recurrent
flooding due to changes in release patterns from a dam controlled
by the Army Corps of Engineers. 181 The plaintiff, Arkansas
Game and Fish Commission, owned a wildlife preserve along the
banks of the Black River in northeast Arkansas. 182 The
Clearwater Dam was located upstream from the Commission’s
land and was constructed by the Corps in 1948. 183 In 1948, the
Corps adopted a plan known as the Water Control Manual to
determine the rates at which water would be released from the
dam. 184 But in 1993, the Corps approved a deviation from the
plan “in response to requests from farmers.” 185 Under the
deviation, “the Corps released water from the Dam at a slower
rate than usual, providing downstream farmers with a longer
harvest time,” but ultimately causing flooding and damage to the
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 520, 522 (2012).
Id. at 518, 520.
Id. at 516-17.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 516.
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 513.
Id. at 516.
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Commission’s land. 186 The Commission objected to these
deviations, but the deviations continued until 2001, when they
were finally abandoned and the original plan was put back into
effect. 187
In 2005, the Commission filed suit claiming that the flooding
caused by the deviations from 1993 to 1999 resulted in substantial
damage to its land including the destruction of timber. 188 At the
trial level, the United States Court of Federal Claims ruled in
favor of the Commission under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and awarded nearly $5.7 million to the
Commission.189 However, the Federal Circuit reversed, finding
no taking. 190 In doing so, the Federal Circuit relied on a 1924
Supreme Court case, Sanguinetti v. United States, which had
summarized the Court’s Fifth Amendment Takings jurisprudence
and then stated:
Under these decisions and those hereafter cited, in order to
create an enforceable liability against the Government, it is,
at least, necessary that the overflow be the direct result of
the structure, and constitute an actual, permanent invasion of
the land, amounting to an appropriation of and not merely an
injury to the property. These conditions are not met in the
present case. 191

The Sanguinetti Court thus found that no taking had
occurred under the Fifth Amendment. 192 The statement above is
a broad rule: no taking unless certain conditions are met, such as
“direct result” (i.e., foreseeability) and permanence. 193 The
statement draws a “no-taking” circle around the large class of
cases that are either not foreseeable or not permanent. 194 This
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 647 (Fed. Cl.
2009).
190. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
191. Id. at 1374, 1378-79; Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924)
(emphasis added).
192. Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149-50.
193. Id. at 149.
194. Id. To say that both foreseeability “and” permanence are “necessary” for a taking,
is to make the conditional statement: if not both foreseeable and permanent, then no taking,
which may be represented as: -(fp)  -t. This is logically equivalent to: (-f v -p)  -t, that
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circle covered the facts of Sanguinetti and led directly to the
judgment of no taking (“These conditions are not met in the
present case”) so the statement was not an aside, though it was
broader than necessary. 195 A narrower rule such as “no taking
unless foreseeable,” would have been sufficient to decide
Sanguinetti. 196
Seizing on the word “permanent” in the above quote from
Sanguinetti, the Federal Circuit in Arkansas reasoned that
because the deviations from the original plan occurred only from
1993-2000 and were never intended to be permanent, they were
only temporary in nature and as such could not be considered a
taking under the broad announced rule of Sanguinetti. 197 In other
words, because the government actions in Arkansas were not
permanent, they fell within Sanguinetti’s broad precedential “notaking” circle. 198 Although the panel majority recognized that
temporary action generally may lead to a temporary takings claim
under the Supreme Court decision in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 199 it was
of the view that “cases involving flooding and flow-age
easements are different.” 200 In support of its flooding distinction,
the Federal Circuit quoted Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., where the Supreme Court had summarized its own
takings cases and stated that they “consistently distinguished
between flooding cases involving a permanent physical
occupation, on the one hand, and cases involving a more
temporary invasion . . . that causes consequential damages
within, on the other.” 201

is, if not foreseeable or not permanent, then no taking. See, e.g., W.V. QUINE, METHODS OF
LOGIC 14 (4th ed. 1982).
195. Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149.
196. Id. at 147-48.
197. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1377-79 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“Because the deviations from the 1953 plan were only temporary, they cannot
constitute a taking . . . . The deviations in question were plainly temporary and the Corps
eventually reverted to the permanent plan.”).
198. Id.
199. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
200. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 637 F.3d at 1374-75.
201. Id. at 1375 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 428 (1982)).
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But the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit. 202 The
Court did not buy the “flooding is different” distinction that the
Federal Circuit had used to avoid First English, noting that there
was “certainly no suggestion in Sanguinetti that flooding cases
should be set apart from the mine run of takings claims.” 203 With
respect to Sanguinetti and the broad quote which the Federal
Circuit had relied upon to require permanence, the Court
narrowed that proposition:
[N]o distinction between permanent and temporary flooding
was material to the result in Sanguinetti. We resist reading
a single sentence unnecessary to the decision as having done
so much work. In this regard, we recall Chief Justice
Marshall’s sage observation that “general expressions, in
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in
which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the
case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the
judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is
presented for decision.” 204

The Court’s statement that the sentence in question from
Sanguinetti was “unnecessary to the decision,” sounds in the
necessity approach discussed in Part III.A.2, though the Court
does not actually say that the sentence was dictum. 205 So perhaps
202. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 523 (2012).
203. Id. at 520.
204. Id. (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)).
205. Id. Although aspects of the holding dicta distinction are at play here, neither the
Federal Circuit opinion nor the Supreme Court opinion in this case would have been picked
up in the empirical study of dictum by David Klein and Neal Devins, which searched for
“‘dictum,’ ‘dicta,’ ‘not a holding,’ or ‘not the holding.’” David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta,
Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2021, 2035 (2013). Nor would the majority opinion in Lexmark International, Inc. v.
Impression Products, Inc., discussed in Part III.B, infra, have been picked up were it not for
the dissent in that case. 816 F.3d 721, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Dyk, J., dissenting). Professors
Klein and Devins acknowledge that their strategy “probably missed some cases in which
lower courts confronted dicta from higher courts but did not draw attention to the fact that
the statements were dicta,” but they consider it “highly unlikely that there are a substantial
number of such cases,” because they “suspect that very few judges would purposefully
engage in unprofessional conduct by pretending not to notice a statement from a higher court
that appears to bear on the case being decided.” Klein & Davis, supra, at 2042. But as these
cases demonstrate, a court is not necessarily acting unprofessionally in narrowing a broad
statement without using those terms. Indeed this is related to the idea that broad statements
are something in between holding and dicta, so it wouldn’t be correct to call them pure dicta.
See id. at 2048 (noting that some of the apparent reluctance to use the holding-dicta
distinction “may be tied to discomfort over the drawing of this line”).
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the Court is using the traditional necessity definition of dicta so
as to find the quoted sentence from Sanguinetti not binding.
However, earlier in the decision, the Court appears to be
using more of the announcement approach, quoting First English
for the proposition that once the government’s actions have
worked a taking of property, “no subsequent action by the
government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for
the period during which the taking was effective.” 206 Under a
pure necessity approach, this generalization from First English
would not have any constraining force, because the First English
Court could have provided a narrower rule, such as one limited to
regulatory (rather than physical) takings, or at least one not
including floodings. 207 Yet the Arkansas Court seems to treat that
broad generalization as having some constraining force. 208 If the
generalization from First English has some precedential weight
even though it wasn’t necessary to the decision, as it appears that
it did for the Arkansas Court, then the Court is not consistently
using the necessity approach in the Arkansas decision. 209
So then maybe the Arkansas Court is using the
announcement approach? But under a pure announcement
approach, the quoted sentence from Sanguinetti would in fact
appear to be a binding holding as the Federal Circuit had found,
since it does appear to be part of the path of reasoning that leads
directly to the result. 210 Given that it did not treat the broad
statement from Sanguinetti as holding, the Arkansas Court is not

206. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519 (quoting First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)).
207. See First English, 482 U.S. at 318-19; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 328 (2002) (describing First English as establishing
the rule that “once a court finds that a police power regulation has effected a ‘taking,’ the
government entity must pay just compensation for the period commencing on the date the
regulation first effected the ‘taking,’ and ending on the date the government entity chooses
to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation”).
208. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 520 (noting that Sanguinetti was
decided before First English, and stating “[i]f the Court [in Sanguinetti] indeed meant to
express a general limitation on the Takings Clause, that limitation has been superseded by
subsequent developments in our jurisprudence”).
209. Id.
210. See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924) (noting that the
flooding at issue was only “periodical,” and that “[i]f there was any permanent impairment
of value, the extent of it does not appear”); see also supra notes 189-92 and accompanying
text.
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consistently using the announcement approach either. 211 Thus the
Court could be using what I have called the “cynical approach,”
applying a narrow necessity approach to precedent it wants to
distinguish (Sanguinetti), and a broad announcement approach to
precedent it wants to use as support (First English). 212 Under the
binary paradigm, such a conclusion is difficult to avoid.
However, the Arkansas Court’s approach to Sanguinetti can
be reconciled with its approach to First English under a spectrum
model. Using the spectrum, the quoted sentence from Sanguinetti
does have some constraining weight, as it is a path-to-judgment
statement and not an aside. 213 However, because it is quite broad
and reaches far beyond the facts that were at issue in Sanguinetti,
its constraining weight is relatively weak. 214 The Arkansas Court
was able to find a principled distinction consistent with the overall
goals and reasoning of Sanguinetti, namely that Sanguinetti
primarily “rested on settled principles of foreseeability and
causation.” 215 The Court appeared to be of the view that the use
of the word “permanent” in Sanguinetti may not have been fully
considered, referring to the “Court’s passing reference to
permanence,” and explaining that “no distinction between
permanent and temporary flooding was material to the result in
Sanguinetti.” 216 The Arkansas Court may have found that
whatever weak constraining weight the broad statement from
Sanguinetti had was outweighed by other factors, such as the
constraining force of First English and other temporary takings
cases. 217 Unlike binary approaches such as announcement and
necessity, the spectrum approach thus provides a framework that
211. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 520.
212. See supra Part III.C.
213. See Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149.
214. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 520.
215. Id. That is, Sanguinetti did not appear to rest on any lack of permanence in the
flooding; rather, it appeared to rest primarily on the idea that the overflow was not “the direct
result of the structure,” or in other words that the flooding was not the foreseeable result of
the government actions. See Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149-50 (“It was not shown that the
overflow was the direct or necessary result of the structure; nor that it was within the
contemplation of or reasonably to be anticipated by the Government.”). The Arkansas Court
emphasized that by contrast, the flooding of the Commission’s land was found to be the
foreseeable result of the Corps’ deviated release patterns. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133
S. Ct. at 523 (“The Court of Federal Claims found that the flooding the Commission assails
was foreseeable.”).
216. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 520.
217. See id.; see also supra note 211.
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can plausibly reconcile a court’s treatment of supporting
precedent (like First English) with its treatment of opposing
precedent (like Sanguinetti).

B. Lexmark International, Inc. v. Impression Products,
Inc.
In Lexmark, before the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, the majority and the dissent disagreed, inter
alia, on how to interpret Supreme Court precedent. 218 The
majority took a flexible approach in some accord with the
spectrum model of holding and dicta. 219 By contrast, the dissent
seemed to take a more rigid announcement approach. 220
The plaintiff, Lexmark, made and sold printers as well as
toner cartridges, and owned a number of patents covering the
cartridges and their use. 221 The relevant cartridges were sold
domestically and at a discount but “subject to an express singleuse/no-resale restriction.” 222 The defendant, Impression, later
acquired the cartridges, not directly from Lexmark, but rather
after a third party had physically modified them so as to enable
re-use, in violation of the restriction. 223 Impression then resold
the cartridges, and Lexmark sued for patent infringement. 224
Impression attempted to defend under the doctrine of patent
exhaustion, arguing that by selling the cartridges, Lexmark had
exhausted its patent rights in those cartridges and could no longer
sue for infringement. 225 Impression pointed to the Supreme Court
decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., which
had stated that “[t]he authorized sale of an article that
substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights
and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control
post-sale use of the article.” 226 As this statement on its face

218. 816 F.3d 721, 726-27 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc), rev’d & remanded, 137 S. Ct.
1523 (2017); id. at 774 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 726-27.
220. Id. at 774, 780 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 727.
222. Id.
223. Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 727.
224. Id. at 728.
225. Id. at 729.
226. Id. at 731; Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
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covered the facts of Lexmark, Impression argued that it should
control. 227
The majority, however, found no exhaustion, and
distinguished Quanta on the grounds that in Quanta, the sales of
the patented article were made by a licensee of the patent, rather
than by the patentee itself, and also the licensee sales of the article
were not subject to any restrictions. 228 Although some broad
statements from Supreme Court cases such as Quanta would
seem to cover the facts in Lexmark and thus require a finding of
patent exhaustion, the Federal Circuit majority narrowed those
statements by interpreting them contextually:
Context is particularly important where, as here, the phrase
being interpreted comes from judicial opinions not directly
deciding the point at issue. Chief Justice Marshall wrote for
the Court almost 200 years ago: “It is a maxim not to be
disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are
to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used.” We bear that maxim in mind in
applying the body of Supreme Court case law on exhaustion:
that body of precedent contains no decision against a
patentee’s infringement assertion in the present
circumstances, and the decisions on related circumstances
require careful reading to determine the best understanding
of what issues the Court actually decided. 229

The dissent, for its part, thought that the majority took too
much liberty with precedent, stating that the majority’s
“justifications for refusing to follow Supreme Court authority
establishing the exhaustion rule misconceive our role as a
subordinate court.” 230 The dissent stated that the majority
“characterize[d] the statements of the exhaustion rule in the
Supreme Court cases as mere dictum . . . .” 231 However, though
the majority did interpret broad statements contextually and

227. Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 729, 738.
228. Id. at 737-38 (“In short, Quanta did not involve the issue presented here. The
facts defining the issues for decision, and the issues decided, were at least two steps removed
from the present case. There were no patentee sales, and there were no restrictions on the
sales made by the licensee.”).
229. Id. at 742 (citation omitted) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
399-400 (1821)).
230. Id. at 780 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
231. Id.
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narrow them, it did not use the term dicta or dictum. 232 Thus, the
dissent seems to have assumed the logic of the binary paradigm:
because the majority did not follow the broad statements from
Quanta and similar cases, the majority necessarily viewed such
statements as dicta. 233
But the majority may instead have been using something like
the spectrum approach, according those broad statements some
constraining weight but finding them outweighed by other factors
in light of their breadth and material factual distinctions. The
majority explained that the broad statements were made in cases
such as Quanta which “did not involve restricted patentee sales
of patented articles,” as were at issue in Lexmark. 234 The majority
at least arguably drew a principled narrowing distinction in this
respect, reasoning that because the Court in cases such as General
Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co. had allowed
patentees to impose restrictions through licenses, they should be
allowed to do so through direct sales as well. 235 Thus the majority
appears to have found the relatively weak precedential constraint
of broad statements from cases like Quanta to have been
outweighed by other cases and considerations. 236
The dissent, by contrast, was taking more of an
announcement approach, stating the Supreme Court “cases

232. See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 721-74.
233. See id. at 780 (Dyk, J., dissenting); Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 957,
961.
234. Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 739, 749 (“[W]e do not think it appropriate to give broad
effect to language in Univis, taken out of context, to support an otherwise-unjustified
conclusion here on a question not faced there.”).
235. See id. at 735 (“It is undisputed and clear under Supreme Court precedent—most
prominently, the 1938 decision in General Talking Pictures—that Lexmark would not have
exhausted its patent rights in those cartridges, upon the manufacturing licensee’s sale (the
first sale), if a buyer with knowledge of the restrictions resold or reused them in violation of
the restrictions . . . . And there is no sound reason, and no Supreme Court precedent,
requiring a distinction that gives less control to a practicing-entity patentee that makes and
sells its own product than to a non-practicing-entity patentee that licenses others to make and
sell the product.” (referring to General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S.
175 (1938))).
236. See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 741. Aside from General Talking Pictures, another
consideration appears to have been the majority’s view that the exhaustion doctrine is an
interpretation of the “‘without authority’ language” in 35 U.S.C. § 271. See id. at 734 (“If
ordinary congressional supremacy is to be respected, exhaustion doctrine in the Patent Act
must be understood as an interpretation of § 271(a)’s ‘without authority’ language.”).
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impose no such qualification on the rule announced.” 237 The
dissent also seemed to imply that even if the broad statements
were dicta they should have been followed simply because they
were written by the Supreme Court. 238 It is indeed sometimes
suggested that courts have a particular obligation to give serious
consideration to Supreme Court dicta. 239 In fact, as the dissent
pointed out, the Federal Circuit has previously stated: “As a
subordinate federal court, we may not so easily dismiss [the
Supreme Court’s] statements as dicta but are bound to follow
them.” 240 It is true that Supreme Court dicta should not be
dismissed “easily,” but it is an overstatement to call them
binding. 241 This should be evident, for example, from the
discussion of Arkansas in Part IV.A, supra, where the Supreme
Court reversed the Federal Circuit and cautioned it not to
obstinately or rigidly apply such “general expressions” from
Supreme Court precedent but, rather, to pay attention to
context. 242 As Judge Leval has explained:
237. Id. at 780 (Dyk, J., dissenting). Although the Supreme Court ultimately reversed
the Federal Circuit majority, this does not necessarily reflect a methodological endorsement
of the announcement approach; rather, this may have had more to do with a difference in
how the Supreme Court weighed and interpreted the various precedents, and how the Court
viewed the exhaustion doctrine generally. Cf. Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, 137 S.
Ct. 1523, 1533-34 (2017) (“The Federal Circuit reached a different result largely because it
got off on the wrong foot . . . . the exhaustion doctrine is not a presumption about the
authority that comes along with a sale; it is instead a limit on the scope of the patentee’s
rights.”) (internal quotations omitted).
238. See id. at 780 n.7 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
239. See, e.g., In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We should not idly
ignore considered statements the Supreme Court makes in dicta. The Supreme Court uses
dicta to help control and influence the many issues it cannot decide because of its limited
docket.”).
240. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (emphasis added); Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 780 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
241. One could, however, argue that broad path-to-judgment statements from Supreme
Court precedent deserve additional constraining weight on lower courts as compared with
such statements from a court’s own precedent, given different considerations as between
vertical stare decisis and horizontal stare decisis. See Schauer, supra note 18, at 576 (“[T]he
hierarchical ordering of decisionmakers implicates considerations different from those
involved when a decisionmaker is constrained by its previous actions as opposed to the
orders of its superiors in the hierarchy.”); Stinson, supra note 3, at 242-243 (“The United
States Supreme Court occupies a unique position in our legal system. In direct contrast to
the theories of judicial restraint that underlie stare decisis, many advocate that the Supreme
Court is not only able to act without restraint, but sometimes obligated to do so.”).
242. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 520 (2012) (quoting
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)). The proposition in question from
Sanguinetti was a broad statement rather than an aside, and as such was not pure dicta under
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Anything the Supreme Court says should be considered with
care; nonetheless, there is a significant difference between
statements about the law, which courts should consider with
care and respect, and utterances which have the force of
binding law. The Supreme Court’s dicta are not law. 243

The spectrum framework is a common ground where the
majority and dissent could have engaged more directly, forcing
each side to more directly address the opposition. The dissent
could, for example, have acknowledged that the broad statement
from Quanta might not have had absolute binding effect on its
own, but argued that the fact that the Court has repeatedly made
such statements increases the constraining weight. 244 And the
majority could have acknowledged that the broad statements from
cases like Quanta do have some weak constraining weight, but
explained that it found those constraints outweighed by other
factors. Such acknowledgements are difficult under a binary
paradigm, where a statement must be either binding holding or
pure dicta, but they are at least possible under a spectrum.245
Thus, although disputes would remain as to its application, the
spectrum approach has the advantage of facilitating judicial
candor and more transparent common analysis. 246

IV. CONCLUSION
Modern scholars correctly reject the facts-plus-outcome
approach and the necessity approach for being inconsistent with
the concept of precedent, as under these methods a case stands as
precedent for nothing beyond its own facts. 247 But with the
announcement approach, the pendulum swings too far in the other
direction, with sweepingly broad announced rules achieving the

the spectrum, but if broad statements are not to be absolutely binding, then pure dicta surely
are not either. See supra Part IV.A.
243. Leval, supra note 20, at 1274.
244. Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 774-776 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (listing quotes from nine
Supreme Court cases).
245. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 957, 961.
246. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 1025 (“We believe that a regime
that encourages a judge to disguise true beliefs about cases ultimately undermines the rule
of law, first by reducing predictability and legal clarity, and second by inhibiting the
emergence of nuanced doctrine.”).
247. Schauer, supra note 18, at 577.
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status of binding holding. 248 The all-or-nothing nature of this
debate rests on the prevailing binary paradigm, where a
proposition must be either holding or dictum, one or the other. 249
When we attempt to discuss the complex reality of precedent
using a binary holding-dicta paradigm, what we end up with is
inconsistency. A court that wants to distinguish a broad
proposition will use a narrow necessity definition, while one that
wants to use such a proposition for support will take a broad
announcement approach. 250 The incoherent binary paradigm
stems in part from the binary nature of judging. Courts must
ultimately decide the case one way or the other and, in explaining
their decisions, have an understandable tendency to spin
statements from precedent as holding or dicta in whatever way
supports the desired result. 251 But the inconsistency is not
acknowledged. Courts maintain the façade that there is some
objective meaning to holding and dicta; that the terms are
constative rather than performative. 252 The effect is to disguise
the true basis for decision.
This article offers a spectrum as a more consistent and
transparent framework, one that accounts for reasonable,
legitimate narrowing of overbroad statements, while still
according some weight to precedent. Though more nuanced than
a binary framework, this approach remains workable by first
setting apart “asides” as pure dictum, and then treating the pathto-judgment reasoning as a spectrum along which constraining
force tends to be inversely proportional to breadth. Such a
framework would encourage disputes over the weight of
precedent to meet head on instead of sailing past each other on
different definitional ships, thereby facilitating judicial candor
and more refined analysis, serving the values of transparency and
rule of law.
Given that the holding-dicta distinction is rather
fundamental in our legal system, the amount of discussion it has
engendered is not surprising. What is perhaps surprising is the

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

EISENBERG, supra note 55, at 55.
Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 4, at 957, 961.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 65.
Id.
See supra Part III.C.
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persistent grab bag of contradictory approaches. 253 Although
some have begun to question the binary nature of the holdingdicta distinction, it is still often taken for granted. 254 It may be
that the binary paradigm is somewhat of a hidden assumption
standing in the way of a more meaningful framework for holding
and dicta. 255

253. But see Dictum Revisited, supra note 2, at 509 (“Few desire to endanger such a
useful tool by subjecting it to the destructive light of analysis.”).
254. See Stinson, supra note 3, at 220.
255. Cf. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1983)
(“[C]ategorical schemes have a power that is greatest when it is least noticed. They channel
the attention of those who use them, structuring experience into the focal and the
peripheral.”).

